Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping, middle right, sits across from Russian President Vladimir Putin during talks in Beijing in February 2022 that led to a joint statement of cooperation. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
FALK TETTWEILER, MARSHALL CENTER RESEARCHER AND ANALYST
The China-Russia joint statement of February 2022 has widely been interpreted as a signal of deeper cooperation between the countries, which are the major challengers to the world order. Some have gone so far as to assess it as a sign of an institutional axis, or even an alliance. However, the lack of official People’s Republic of China (PRC) support for Russia’s illegal attack on Ukraine has sown doubts regarding this argument. Deeper scrutiny of existing cooperation between Russia and the PRC, and the declarations in the statement, show that there are common interests and the perception of a common opponent — the “liberal West” — but the uninspiring statement also implies that they do not share a common vision of the future.
The countries might be less aligned than it appears. Challenging the West and the existing world order requires a safe and secure home base for the PRC and Russia. Consequently, the common security interests of both countries, presented in the joint statement, lie mainly in ensuring their visions of security and stability in their adjacent regions, countering interference by outside forces in what they consider “internal affairs,” and opposing attempts by their citizens to gain more freedom. However, besides these common interests, there are huge differences in their respective visions of a new world order. In comparison to Russia’s negative vision, conceptualizing itself as a victim of the West, the PRC vision might be seen as a real alternative by some countries. Also, the relationship between Russia and the PRC has been marked by decades of deep mistrust. It is likely that these differences will prevail despite increased cooperation in some fields.
China-Russia military cooperation has a decades-long history of ups and downs. The relationship is one-sided and always distrustful. Until relatively recently, the relationship has been asymmetric, with the Soviet Union/Russia as the provider of technology and know-how, though the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) never accepted its more powerful partner as a leader or dominator. Instead, it used Russia as a means to an end. The Soviet Union began supporting the newly formed communist movement in China in the 1920s and played an essential role in building the Red Army during the Chinese civil war. Thus, it helped Mao Zedong, who famously said that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun,” to defend his power position against rivals inside the CCP and against external enemies, such as local warlords, the Kuomintang and the Imperial Japanese Army. The Soviets continued to support the armament of CCP forces — renamed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) — after the PRC’s founding in 1949. This helped cement Mao’s rule over the CCP and the PRC.
With Soviet support, the CCP quickly built a credible communist force in the region and a sustainable armaments industry. For example, applying Soviet expertise, the Chinese armaments industry engineered its first fighter aircraft (the Dongfeng-101, later renamed Shenyang J-5) in 1956 and its first nuclear bomb in 1964. But the validity of another famous Mao quote, that “whoever wants to seize and retain state power must have a strong army,” also proved to be true in the Sino-Soviet relationship a few years later. As the CCP grew in confidence, ideological differences became more obvious. Border disputes between the PRC and Russia became hot in the 1960s and led to an open conflict in 1969. In 1971, the Sino-Soviet split was complete as the countries supported opposing sides during the war between India and Pakistan. Despite both being communist regimes, the PRC and the Soviet Union were more opponents than partners over the next 18 years. During this period military cooperation came to a halt. It was not until 1989, with the rapid decline of Soviet economic power and the CCP’s political isolation after its Tiananmen Square massacre, that the countries renewed military cooperation.
After revitalizing the relationship in the 1990s, the CCP relied on Russian foreign military sales to modernize the PLA’s outdated equipment. The United States’ successful military campaign during the 1991 Gulf War was an eye-opener for PLA strategists and led to major military reforms and also made Russian equipment and know-how more than welcome. Also, the PLA started participating in multilateral military exercises within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2003 and in bilateral exercises with the Russian armed forces in 2005.
The PLA remained an important power instrument for the CCP in the following years, but the country’s fast economic growth was the paramount objective and the political leadership’s focus. “Getting rich” was the slogan during this period, which ended with the election of Xi Jinping as general secretary of the CCP in 2012. The slogan of the Xi era is “getting strong,” and the PLA has a vital role in the CCP’s plans for China’s future. Mao’s dictum that whoever has an army has power has regained its relevance for realizing the “China Dream” and the “Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” — central concepts of Xi’s agenda.
The PLA’s importance for Xi’s plans is reflected in the ambitious timeline for its reform. The PLA wants to become a world-class force that is a peer to the U.S. military by the middle of the 21st century. The PLA is training and equipping for a new kind of warfare of integrated joint operations in all domains — land, sea, air, cyber and space — as well as strongly focusing on the cognitive domain. Some milestones to achieving that goal are mechanization by 2020, which was delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic, and complete modernization by 2027. The latter comprises the first as well as “informatization” and the PLA’s ability to conduct “intelligentized” warfare. Informatization means that the PLA must be equipped to conduct integrated joint operations in all domains, first on a local level and then a global level. Also, the aim of intelligentization requires the consequent use of science and technology for artificial intelligence, which has been used to monitor Chinese society. CCP leadership has made it clear that the informatization and intelligentization are far more important than full mechanization because the PLA recognizes that the days of solely mechanized warfare are over. Therefore, the science and technology sectors play an invaluable role in the implementation of PLA reforms. Thus, they cannot be seen as separate from the military, as in some Western countries.
Following the intelligent integration and integrated joint operations approach could lead to a revolution in military affairs. It would mean that the PLA could abandon Western concepts of warfare and lean more toward a traditional Chinese approach to strategy. The PLA’s aim would no longer be to simply accelerate its own observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop and beat the opponent on the battlefield, as in typical Western concepts. The objective would be to manipulate the entire OODA loop of the opponent to “win the war” before a potential violent confrontation. If the PLA shapes the opponent’s perception and orientation, it can influence its decisions, actions and feedback loops. Implementing this idea — understanding armies as systems and conceptualizing war as a confrontation of these systems — means that a war could be won without fighting or before the fighting starts. This revolutionary change in concepts would mean a return to Sun Tzu’s approach to strategy and turning away from the common interpretation of military theorist Carl von Clausewitz regarding the value of decisive battles.
These conceptual deliberations also have implications for the development of China-Russia military cooperation. The significance of a strong science and technology sector in the PRC was already articulated in 2015 in the “Made in China 2025” initiative and in 2020 with the “dual circulation” idea. The PRC’s ambition to become the leader in certain technology domains is reflected in its armaments industry, which is closely linked to its technology industry. The aim to domestically produce high-tech products is also applicable to the Chinese armaments industry, which is experiencing rapid modernization and greater self-reliance and autonomy. Consequently, the PRC has become less dependent on Russian foreign military sales. Currently, China mainly imports Russian-built aircraft engines, although China’s aeronautics industry is catching up. Also, the existing Russia-China relationship and military cooperation is strained by the PRC’s practice of copying and reverse-engineering technology and equipment, and by its theft of intellectual property and its industrial espionage, such as PRC cyberattacks on Russian arms-producing companies.
Since 2003 the second pillar of China-Russia military cooperation has been military exercises, with at least 79 bilateral and multilateral training events. While Russia alleviates its political isolation and gains the opportunity to advertise its military equipment, the PLA gains operational experience in a variety of geographies and climates and learns tactics and procedures from the more experienced Russian armed forces. With the shrinking Russian technological lead and the obvious underperformance of Russia’s armed forces in its war on Ukraine, the tangible benefits for the PRC will decrease in the foreseeable future. During the Vostok exercise in 2022, the PLA for the first time trained with Chinese-manufactured equipment only. As soon as PRC-produced military equipment becomes equal or superior to Russia’s, the PLA could use multilateral exercises to promote its equipment and thereby compete with Russia. This would again have a negative influence on the bilateral relationship because foreign military sales are, next to natural resources, an important source of income for the Russian state. Therefore, it is likely that the mutual benefits of bilateral and multilateral exercises will be limited to sending political and strategic signals toward the U.S. and its Allies and Partners in the region, and to reducing tensions between the PRC and Russia.
Russia-China military cooperation seems to be at a tipping point and leaning toward decline. The war in Ukraine proves that Russia is still very much stuck in a more traditional concept of warfare. Although Russia’s deception operation prior to the invasion matches the direction of Chinese thinking on the future of warfare, Moscow’s poor assessment of the situation on the ground in Ukraine and the lack of preparation of the cognitive battlefield demonstrate that Russia is not yet there. As the Russian armed forces were unable to meet the expectations as a role model for competition with the U.S., and with the Russian armament industry’s technological lead shrinking, the CCP will not invest much in stronger cooperation in these fields. However, this will not end military cooperation between China and Russia unless Moscow crosses Beijing’s red lines, such as using nuclear weapons in its war against Ukraine. But the cooperation will merely be symbolic and on a political level to challenge the U.S.-led liberal West — with Russia likely the junior partner in the relationship.
This article originally was published by Indo-Pacific Defense Forum, a publication of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.
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