DR. P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER and DR. ADAM LAJEUNESSE
Since Russia’s unprovoked February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the world has witnessed the further spillover of international tensions into circumpolar affairs. Maintaining peace and stability in the Arctic, within a world of heightened uncertainty, has forced NATO partners to reevaluate threats, strategic responsibilities and opportunities for deeper collaboration as Arctic allies.
In August 2022, after touring the Canadian Arctic, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg published an article in the Canadian newspaper The Globe and Mail pointing to the myriad new threats facing the region. While the Arctic has traditionally been an area of low tensions, Stoltenberg wrote, a rapidly warming climate and rising global competition have created a new dynamic whereby authoritarian regimes “are stepping up their activities and interest.” Both Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are now more present and, in the case of Russia, “clearly willing to use military intimidation or aggression to achieve their aims.”
Threats that may pass through the Arctic include cruise missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles, ballistic missiles, bombers and submarines. These are generally geared toward combat and deterrence, and thus best considered on a global scale rather than the regional security one. Still, they have an Arctic nexus for North Americans because both Canada and the United States have Arctic capabilities vital to detecting and defeating these global threats. These threats are best seen as “through” threats: part of comprehensive deterrence that is integrated across domains as well as theaters of competition and potential conflict. Meeting these threats means integrating all instruments of national power, including across allies and partners.
Discussions about NATO’s role in the region typically link the Arctic to the maritime approaches of allied territory in the North Atlantic, global trade and supply chains, sea lines of communication, transatlantic reinforcement, and reaffirming that NATO Article 5 applies. All of this is appropriate, even though it may play into Russian threat narratives about alleged NATO aggression (and clearly more so in the Baltic than in Baffin Bay). As the Arctic becomes a more explicit NATO priority, however, the alliance must also adopt more precise messaging that distinguishes military threats that may pass through regions of the Arctic from those risks or threats that may arise from Arctic disputes. In short, we need more nuance in our messaging about the Arctic — something that requires a sophisticated level of situational awareness, with the Arctic states best placed to retain primacy of decision-making over Arctic security and defense matters, even within a NATO context.
Gen. Glen D. VanHerk, commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command, emphasizes that “our competitors’ actions are global. We must create global plans that have regional components” and strategies “that integrate homeland defense and strategic deterrence into every aspect of our defense.” The Arctic fits this logic because it is a strategic region best situated in a global context. Accordingly, the fundamental pillars of a layered, all-domain North American defense ecosystem apply to Arctic defense and security more generally and suggest natural alignments in national priorities across like-minded Arctic states that can be synchronized to strategic effect as allies.
Most Arctic states assess a relatively low risk of armed conflict in the Arctic compared with other regions, with forms of interstate competition already occurring below the threshold of armed conflict. This is not surprising, given that such aggression would escalate into a general war that Russia could not hope to win. As such, Moscow has resorted to hybrid warfare, cyberattacks, cyber espionage and disinformation campaigns. These tactics are now central pillars of Russian and Chinese approaches to strategic competition and warfare. Russia’s Arctic strategy is unlikely to be an invasion of a NATO Arctic ally. Rather, it will likely seek to exploit divisions among and within our Arctic states through concerted information campaigns designed to polarize populations and widen existing fault lines with intent to destabilize our democratic societies.
These messaging campaigns also seek to legitimize Russia’s position as the major Arctic power and frame its Arctic military investments as defensive in nature, naturally in opposition to potential NATO aggression. We also see Russia weaponizing its energy and food exports as tools of geopolitical coercion, while at the same time insisting that it will turn to “non-Arctic states” (particularly the PRC) to forge ahead with its regional development plans.
For its part, the PRC, the aspiring self-proclaimed “polar great power,” has targeted scientific, shipping and economic sectors in the Arctic. Like-minded Arctic states are increasingly aware of the risks associated with a Chinese presence, with some having taken steps to block Chinese investment on national security grounds. Yet, risks remain as the PRC normalizes its footprints in the region and strengthens its economic partnership with Russia in the North.
While the threat of a conventional military attack in the Arctic remains low, the spillover of international dynamics into the region is already visible. This heightens the importance of meetings between Arctic allies, such as the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR) in Alaska in May 2022 and of the Arctic Chiefs of Heads of Defence (ACHOD) in Newfoundland in August 2022. Operationalizing this collaboration as like-minded Arctic states is vital to showing the world that NATO is working together from the same playbook. It also signals that the alliance is ready to deter — and defeat — any potential adversaries.
In a changing world, deliberate strategic messaging is more important than ever. While European and North American countries often communicate with Russia differently, it is imperative that allies carefully calibrate messaging to ensure that we are projecting unity, strength and confidence with clarity, precision and consistency. This includes reinforcing how integrated deterrence — particularly as exercised by like-minded states in an alliance or partnership context — is a source of regional stability. By improving the sharing of information among allies and synchronizing our Arctic-related homeland defense efforts, we will be better placed to manage the regional security space in a rational, proportionate and resource-effective manner while reinforcing the principle of collective defense.
The Kremlin’s foremost goal is to fragment our alliances and our partnerships as like-minded Arctic states. We must ensure that these relationships remain strong and are continuously reinforced. This means being more active and less passive in tending to alliances. The ASFR and ACHODs meetings, as well as the NATO secretary general’s visit to the Canadian Arctic, send strong strategic messages in their own right. They also reinforce the value of structured dialogue so that we can stay on top of developments, maintain pressure and discern ways to challenge and, where necessary, confront competitors in an uncertain Arctic and increasingly complex world.