Recent Chinese activity in the Arctic such as the recent voyage of the Xue Long 2 has raised concerns in the West, but it may prove more threatening to Russia in the long term.
ADAM LAJEUNESSE, Ph.D./BRIAN MULRONEY INSTITUTE
As the icebreaker Xue Long 2 left Shanghai for China’s 13th Arctic expedition in July 2023, concerns mounted once again in the West that scientific work concealed the development of dual-purpose polar military technology or was paving the way for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to exploit natural resources or, perhaps, commence submarine operations. Accentuating these fears was a Canadian discovery of Chinese monitoring buoys in the Arctic. The nature and location of the buoys remain classified, but their discovery has stoked concerns of Arctic encroachment by the PRC.
While sensational claims of Chinese conquest are premature, the Arctic expeditions raise real concerns that the PRC is preparing for a more sustained Arctic presence.
As early as 2008, the original Xue Long began deploying what Chinese scientists described as “underwater robots.” Four years later, the Polar Research Institute of China (PRIC) advertised its success in deploying buoys for the first time to observe air-sea interactions in the Norwegian Sea.
By 2018, that program of work had expanded considerably. As part of the country’s ninth Arctic expedition, Xue Long deployed an unmanned ice station on an Arctic floe. The PRIC also boasted of its success in testing underwater gliders and sediment traps.
It also tested the submersible Haiyan underwater glider in the Bering Sea, vehicles used to monitor the deep-sea environment in vast areas. In 2020, three of these devices were deployed simultaneously. This glider system is not Arctic-specific technology, and Beijing is working to adapt and test its existing systems in an ice-infested environment — clearly with some success. Most recently, the PRC made waves when it announced plans for a network of listening buoys to study whales, fish and ocean circulation. Many analysts point to ships and submarines as the real targets.
Just how threatening these experiments are remains debatable. Unmanned vehicles are widely used by other Arctic states and have legitimate scientific capabilities. Still, the military applications are also obvious. Because gliders have no propulsion systems, the acoustic signature is extremely low, making them ideal for undersea warfare.
The mapping of the region’s seafloor, salinity levels and water temperature are also perfectly legitimate scientific pursuits. Indeed, this work is framed in English and Chinese language discussions as civilian environmental research, designed to better understand the Arctic region and a changing global climate. Still, this is also the prerequisite work for submarine operations in the Arctic waters, mirroring studies undertaken by the U.S. and Canada in the 1950s and 1960s for that purpose.
While these developments have raised justifiable concerns in the West, they are often viewed through the traditional zero-sum security mindset inherent to great-power competition. The realities of Arctic security, and the PRC’s long-term presence in the region are far more complex, and it raises questions: Not only whether the PRC is a threat, but also who is most threatened by this polar ambition? While Washington may look upon these developments with concern, Moscow should be fretting far more.
While the Sino-Russian friendship is officially a “no-limits” partnership, it is widely believed those ties are based on a temporary confluence of interests and shared disdain for the West.
While that relationship is outwardly cozy today, Russia’s vulnerability in the North must surely leave it watching these voyages with dismay.
Western scholars may lament the danger of Chinese encroachment on our traditional sphere of activity, but the reality is Russia has far more to fear from a Chinese Arctic presence. Simply put, it has more invested in the region. The U.S. does not rely on the Arctic for trade, resources or the strategic movement of ships or goods, but Russia does. Roughly 22% of Russia’s export earnings come from the Arctic, with 90% of its natural gas and 12% of its oil produced in the Yamal-Nenets region alone.
It’s strange that Western observers rarely ask what impact Chinese icebreakers mapping the seafloor might have on Russian sensibilities. A Chinese nuclear-powered submarine operating in the Barents or Kara Seas could cover the entire area from Novaya Zemlya to the Kola Peninsula, interdicting shipping or shutting it down simply by demonstrating the capability to do so — landlocking the 70 million tons of liquified natural gas exports expected to be online by 2030. Land-attack cruise missiles fired from the sea at vulnerable, high-value targets, such as the $27 billion Yamal natural gas facilities or offshore platforms, could inflict crippling damage on Russia’s economy.
More impactful than any direct damage, a Chinese submarine presence in the Arctic would require the Russian Navy to deploy its best assets to track, monitor and attack in the event of war. That task would force a disproportionate investment from the Russian Navy, tying up many high-value nuclear submarines and anti-submarine warfare assets. Even a small number of People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarines in the Russian Arctic would limit the number of Russian ships that could be spared for the Pacific, while also putting those boats in ideal positions to interdict any ships that tried the transfer. Interdicting Russian warships along the Siberian coast would certainly be easier than locating them after they slipped into the Pacific shipping lanes.
Russia should be concerned that Chinese research vessels are creeping closer to the Siberian coast. Since the earliest Chinese expeditions, there has been a clear focus on the Bering, Chukchi and Beaufort seas off Alaska. Despite having the lions’ share of the Arctic coast, Russia has rarely seen Chinese operations on its continental shelf, including beyond 200 nautical miles. In 2020 that changed. That year, the PRC announced the inaugural research program for Xue Long 2’s maiden Arctic voyage, which centered on a survey of Gakkel Ridge. This area of seafloor is suspected of containing massive sulfides and is rich in copper, zinc and other minerals. The Chinese voyage, focused on such an important area, directly abutting Russia’s continental shelf, rattled Moscow and prompted an official reaction. Following the announcement of Xue Long 2’s route, Russia submitted an addendum to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, which incorporated the Gakkel Ridge area into its extended continental shelf claim.
The 13th Arctic expedition is treading these same grounds, again traveling to the Gakkel Ridge and Russia’s Exclusive Economic Zone. Although Xue Long 2 is advertised as working with Russian partners, the nature of that partnership is never elaborated upon, leaving the impression that a Russian scientist may have been attached to the voyage as a concession to Moscow’s growing unease at the PRC’s presence.
The PRC’s objectives remain unclear. But given its aggressive behavior closer to home, it’s reasonable to look upon it with suspicion. Yet, the security picture in the region is often painted with far too simplistic a brush. As the PRC maps out a longer-term Arctic presence, few if any Western vital interests seem threatened. The view from Moscow, however, may be far less comfortable. While today that relationship may be a friendship without limits, tomorrow may bring different political realities.
Dr. Adam Lajeunesse is an associate professor of public policy at St Francis Xavier University in Nova Scotia, Canada. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not necessarily reflect the policies of U.S. Northern Command or the U.S. government.
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