Warships transit the Arabian Sea during a joint naval exercise involving Iran, the People’s Republic of China and Russia in March 2023. THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
ADAM LAJEUNESSE AND DR. P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER
The Chinese and Russian navies made headlines in July and August 2023 with a large-scale naval exercise that ranged from the Yellow Sea to the Aleutian Islands. Over several weeks, a dozen warships conducted drills to improve interoperability and, more importantly, to send a powerful political message. The nature of that message varied, however, depending on the speaker, with Russian and Chinese officials seeking to harness the exercises to their own strategic needs. It is unlikely that this will be the last such deployment, and the United States must carefully calibrate its response to avoid playing into the hands of its adversaries.
How the two authoritarian powers depicted these exercises speaks volumes about their objectives. Rather than a coherent, joint messaging campaign, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia leveraged them for different political objectives. For Beijing, the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait loomed large. These exercises were, in part, a response to U.S. and allied freedom of navigation operations (FONOP) through Chinese-claimed waters and a fishing expedition to provoke U.S. indignation. By moving close to the Aleutian Islands, the PRC was able to send a clear message — that it, too, could poke the U.S. close to home. Provoking U.S. officials and commentators also served the PRC’s purpose in indirectly delegitimizing the U.S. FONOPs. Criticism of the PRC’s naval presence would expose U.S. hypocrisy and paint U.S. voyages as political tools rather than genuine attempts to buttress freedom of navigation and international law. This theme is common in Chinese state media reporting on the exercises, with the state-run China Daily newspaper offering the best overview. In an August 11 article in its English-language edition, the newspaper reveled in the fact that the exercise “has riled up the U.S. media” and “reveals the U.S.’ double standard in that it frequently deploys warships and aircrafts to the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait for so-called freedom of navigation operations but does not accept other nations’ military presence close to them.”
In standard Chinese double-speak, these voyages were a response to U.S. FONOPs and — in that manner — a demonstration of U.S. hypocrisy. At the same time, the Chinese claim they are nothing like the aggressive U.S. operations, according to an August 22, 2023, report by The Global Times, the flagship newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party. In the PRC’s telling, the joint naval patrol was “not aimed at a third party and was not related to the current global or regional situation.” The Chinese Navy’s behavior is therefore “completely different from the practices of some other countries that cling to the Cold War mentality, engage in camp confrontation and bully hegemony everywhere,” said a spokesperson for China’s Ministry of National Defense, according to a report in China Daily. Instead, China’s behavior is portrayed as “open and transparent,” aiming “to jointly defend international fairness and justice and maintain world and regional security and stability.”
For the PRC, this exercise furthered several political objectives. It pushed back against what it perceives as U.S. intrusions into its backyard, while using the U.S. reaction to delegitimize the U.S. Navy’s FONOPs. As a bonus, it“displayed the high level” of “military cooperation and mutual trust” with Russia and demonstrated its ability to project power into the North Pacific and toward the strategically significant entrance to the Arctic Ocean, according to the report in The Global Times.
In Russian media, the exercises were presented in a different light. While the PRC’s objectives required that the exercises be presented as peaceful, Russia sought to show a budding military alliance. As its forces founder in Ukraine and it finds itself increasingly isolated globally, Moscow sees value in linking the PRC’s growing military strength to its cause. Russian media therefore consistently highlighted the exercises’ combat drills as a response to a “hostile” West. Rather than a mission to “defend international fairness and justice,” the Russian news agency TASS showcased drills to repel air attacks and sink submarines. Attached naval aviation, meanwhile, was shown responding to an “enemy force” attacking the joint naval group. State media outlet Sputnik even offered videos to let viewers watch the navies of the PRC and Russia “destroying target in joint drills.”
This more militarized depiction aligns with Moscow’s greater need to be seen as a great power that retains great power friends. It reinforces Russia’s claim that it and the PRC represent a competing ideological, economic and political pole in opposition to the West, and one that can and will continue to challenge the West from a position of strength.
Tailoring a response to such activity requires a nimble and targeted approach, and the discipline to avoid being drawn into messaging traps. What the Chinese government wanted more than anything from these exercises was an aggressive and confrontational response. This would signal that they had successfully hit a nerve — as the U.S. Navy repeatedly does in the South China Sea. It would also provide propaganda to try to delegitimize U.S. FONOPs. How can the U.S. pretend to be enforcing international law when it behaves differently in its own backyard?
To its credit, the U.S. government reacted strategically and refused to be baited. When asked about the exercise, Pentagon press secretary Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder stated that the North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command were monitoring the exercises but that the Chinese and Russian ships remained in international waters. “At no point in time,” Ryder told reporters, “were they deemed to pose a threat. And so, like any country, they are free to conduct exercises in international airspace, international waters.” Four U.S. Navy destroyers were dispatched to monitor the exercise but not to stop it. The official U.S. response was calm and deprived Beijing of the hypocritical and hysterical reaction it craved. This is plainly evident in Chinese reporting, which downplays this carefully considered official response. Instead, Chinese media amplified the more confrontational voices coming from commentators and think tanks, which are used as proxies, representing the response that Beijing had hoped to elicit. Instead, the Global Times and China Daily elevate criticisms from commentators such as Brent Sadler, a senior research scientist at the Heritage Foundation, who called the exercises “highly provocative.” This offered the PRC its strawman reaction, enabling the government press to hit back that “nothing can better describe the U.S.’ reaction than ‘nonsense.’ The U.S. could not even defend its own logic. If the China-Russia joint patrol was in international waters, how can it be viewed as a provocation or aggression?” stated the Global Times.
Alarmist Western statements play to Russia’s objectives as well. When officials elevate these activities to the realm of serious threats, they convey exactly the kind of respect for Russian capabilities that Moscow is desperate to elicit. This legitimizes Russia’s shaky claim to global power status, exaggerates its conventional capabilities and supports broader Russian deterrence strategies.
Managing the response is therefore a balancing act. These activities cannot be ignored or even downplayed, but emphasis should be put on short-circuiting adversary messaging. Beijing is anxious to paint U.S. FONOPs as shams. While the U.S. government has been disciplined in its messaging as it was during a similar voyage in 2021, more emphasis should be placed on the PRC’s right to be there. Though it may seem counterintuitive, there is a benefit to overtly recognizing Chinese ships’ right to be in the region. While that may be politically tricky, it should be possible to warn of the dangers posed by the PRC’s navy generally, while also emphasizing its right to be anywhere on the high seas.
Russia’s attempt to portray itself as a great power equal, capable of threatening the U.S. homeland can, likewise, be turned back upon itself. The reality is that Moscow’s weakness has forced it to increasingly rely on the PRC for economic and political support. Its naval partnership should be addressed more explicitly for what it is, the gradual replacing of Russian power in the North Pacific and, potentially, the Arctic by the PRC.
Russia has long avoided inviting the PRC into the Arctic region and weakness, not fraternal partnership, has led to these joint exercises. Behind the confident rhetoric is insecurity or what researcher Dr. Andreas Østhagen described as being akin to when “my mother-in-law wants to stay with us for a couple of weeks until she finds something else.” One may pretend that she’s welcome, but there is tension under the surface. U.S. messaging should highlight not only the PRC’s growing role in the region but also the shift in power dynamics that may see it supplant a declining Russia. For Russia, firm control over its Arctic is economically and strategically existential. Roughly 22% of the nation’s export earnings come from the Arctic, with about 90% of Russia’s natural gas and about 12% of its oil produced in the Yamal Nenets region alone. A Chinese Navy Arctic capability may elicit concern from the West, but it should provoke terror in Moscow.
Dr. Adam Lajeunesse Adam Lajeunesse is an associate professor in the Public Policy and Governance Program at St. Francis Xavier University in Canada. Dr. P. Whitney Lackenbauer is the network lead and Canada Research Chair (Tier 1) in the study of the Canadian North and a professor at the School for the Study of Canada at Trent University.
The Watch is a professional military journal published by U.S. Northern Command to provide an international forum for military personnel and academics involved in homeland defense. The opinions expressed in this piece do not necessarily represent the policies or points of view of the command or any other agency of the U.S. government.
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